

ANDRES BONIFACIO

Biographical notes

Part VII: April 15, 1897 – May 10, 1897



15 Apr
1897

Bonifacio resists the mounting challenge to his authority by reaffirming that he remains the revolution's supreme leader.



Pictured here is his appointment of Emilio Jacinto as Commander of the Army in the District North of Manila (*Pangulong hukbo sa dakong Hilagaan ng Maynila*), written on a printed form designed to be used for making a series of appointments, civil as well as military. At the top of the form, beneath Bonifacio's name is printed the title "President of the Sovereign Nation of Katagalugan," and then, as if to emphasize his unique status, "Founder of the K. K. Katipunan of the Sons of the People and Prime Instigator of the Revolution."

The appointment states that it has been made by the "Supreme Presidency" (*Kataastaasang Panguluhan*), a term not found on earlier documents. Although very similar to Bonifacio's long-standing title within the Katipunan – "Supreme President" (*Kataastaasang Pangulo*) - the shift to the word "Presidency" seems to suggest an executive wing of government, a presidential office, rather than solely the president as an individual. Both the KKK councils in Cavite - the Magdiwang and

Magdalo – had been using the term “Presidency” (*Panguluhan*) to refer to their own governments, and the designation “Supreme Presidency” makes explicit the subordination of such localized, zonal executives to the central executive, in other words, to Bonifacio and his office.

Bonifacio decrees that the rank bestowed upon Jacinto must be respected by all subjects of the “Government of the Revolution” (“*Pamahalaan nang Panghihimagsik*”). This is another term not found on earlier documents, and it asserts in effect that a new government is not needed, because one already exists – a government whose authority should be acknowledged and obeyed by every citizen.¹

The revolutionists who already saw Aguinaldo as the legitimate president would regard Bonifacio’s action in making such appointments as at best unauthorized and invalid, and at worst treasonous. High-level appointments in the revolutionary army, they would insist, should now be a matter for Aguinaldo, its commander in chief.

Mid-
April

Bonifacio meets the leaders of the recently formed Regional Government of Batangas, most likely at their base “in exile” in Indang, Cavite, about 20 kilometers southeast of Naic.² The Batangueños tell Bonifacio about their plans to launch simultaneous attacks on the Spanish garrisons in eight towns in their province, and he agrees to send 40 of his own troops under the command of General Artemio Ricarte to support them.³

The Batangas revolutionists, Bonifacio is pleased to tell Jacinto, “are under the authority (*kapangyarihan*) of the Supreme Council, and recognize our authority... Their general is called Don Miguel Malvar, a very intelligent man, and better, perhaps, than the generals we have so far come to know here [in Cavite].”⁴




Miguel Malvar

The adherence of the Batangas revolutionists to the Katipunan, however, was not as solid or straightforward as Bonifacio wanted to believe. Malvar sought help from wherever he could get it, and was in contact with Aguinaldo as well. Even if Malvar had been personally inclined to align with Bonifacio, moreover, he would not have had the backing of the Regional Government of Batangas as a whole. Its interior minister, Santiago Rillo, had been one of the prime movers behind Aguinaldo’s election at Tejeros, and had subsequently taken it upon himself to be Aguinaldo’s eyes and ears in the Batangas government.⁵

16 Apr
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Bonifacio writes to Jacinto to tell him about the Tejeros convention, “the turmoil here,” and the military defeats. In Cavite, he notes sadly, the unity and fortitude that formerly prevailed [has] now been lost”. He worries the same might happen in central Luzon, where he fears a local leader named Mamerto Natividad will soon “be doing there what he did here [in Cavite]: slander us” (“*gawin sa dakong iyan ang ginawa niya ditong paninira sa atin*”).



Bonifacio is uncertain about his own plans. If the Batangueños have the good fortune to take the town of Lipa, he says, they will invite him to go there and establish a base from which the revolution could be expanded southwards into the Camarines.

But he wonders too whether he should head north, and go together with Jacinto to Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. The Katipuneros who had gone to Cavite from the Manila region, he says, desperately want now to return home. They are begging him to help them get away, and to take them “back there, to our place” (*“ang lahat halos (ng mga K) ay naglulumuhod sa akin, na silay ilayas ko na at dalhin diyan sa atin”*).

And yet, Bonifacio tells Jacinto, he feels he cannot accede to their request, “because I pity the great number of innocent citizens [in the Cavite towns not yet captured by the Spaniards] who will be facing the most dreadful troubles and slaughter” (*“datapua’t hindi ko payagan ito sa pagkat ako’y naaawa sa makapal na taong bayan na walang kasalanan ay siyang aabutin ng katakot takot na pagkaligalig at kamatayan.”*) He is also reluctant to leave Cavite immediately because he still wants to wait for the expected shipment of weapons to arrive from Hong Kong.

Bonifacio seems torn. He wants to be gone from Cavite, but also feels obliged to stay a while longer. He asks Jacinto to advise him where he is needed most.⁶

Bonifacio asks a Katipunan leader from Laguna, Antonino Guevara, to deliver the letter in person to Jacinto, who was then in the town of Pasig or thereabouts. Bonifacio also instructs Guevara to discuss with Jacinto and with Julio Nakpil (who was also in the Pasig area) yet another possible course of action – mounting an attack on Spanish positions in Laguna.⁷ What he had in mind, presumably, was a joint operation involving the forces around Manila under Jacinto and forces that he and Guevara would mobilize in the south.

c. 19
Apr

Bonifacio had another, still more compelling, reason for delaying his departure. Convinced that the revolution was being betrayed, he wanted to depose Aguinaldo from his leadership position, whether that be War President of the Magdalo council (the title Aguinaldo was still using) or President-elect of the Philippine Republic (which had not yet been proclaimed and which Bonifacio and the Magdiwang “loyalists” rejected as illegitimate).

To succeed, Bonifacio and the Magdiwang “loyalists” needed to alert other revolutionists to the danger they perceived, and most crucially they needed to persuade the Magdalo army that Aguinaldo was double-dealing. Every officer and soldier in the Magdalo army, they hoped, would see that they had a patriotic duty to defect, and to transfer their

allegiance to an army headed by commanders who remained steadfast to the cause. If the Magdalo army could be won over, they visualized, Aguinaldo would be discredited and isolated, and the forces of the revolution would be united in their determination to fight on.

On or about April 19, Bonifacio and his associates convened a meeting at the *casa hacienda* in Naic to constitute the new army and, presumably, to discuss strategy and tactics, to decide exactly how to proceed. Most senior among the commanders who attended were Santiago Alvarez, Artemio Ricarte, Luciano San Miguel and Santos Nocon from the Magdiwang army; Pedro Giron from the Balara men; and Pio del Pilar, Mariano Noriel and Modesto Ritual from the Magdalo army. Also present were four Magdiwang ministers – Mariano Alvarez, Ariston Villanueva, Diego Mojica and Mariano Trias – and two town presidents, Severino de las Alas from Indang, and José Tagle from Imus.

Bonifacio and his associates must have discussed the meeting in advance, both among themselves and with the Magdalo commanders they had invited. They had persuaded the Magdalo commanders to bring their troops with them to the estate house on the promise that they would be served “delicious food” (“*masarap na rancho*”). It is therefore difficult to imagine that the meeting could have been kept secret, but it was held behind closed doors, and guards were posted with orders to stop anyone who had not been invited from entering.


Bonifacio took the chair, and presented the case against Aguinaldo.⁸ He looked back to before the Tejeros convention, when Aguinaldo had signalled his willingness to enter peace negotiations with the Spaniards. He then mentioned the surrender, a week previously, of Daniel Tirona, José del Rosario, Juan Cailles and other Magdalo leaders, which Aguinaldo had failed to prevent or instantly condemn. At about the same time, Bonifacio alleged, Aguinaldo had agreed to release the three Spanish prisoners of war, and had authorized the Magdalo minister of finance, Cayetano Topacio, to escort them safely to the Spanish authorities in Tanza. When he, Bonifacio, had found out about the release, he had ordered his men to detain Topacio and the prisoners. Topacio had been court-martialed (“*pinaghatulan sa Sangunian Digma*”), but had not been punished.⁹ “*Favoritismo*” had prevailed, and “people covered up for each other”.¹⁰

And now, Bonifacio claimed, the full extent of Aguinaldo’s treachery had been revealed. He too was planning to surrender – not just himself alone, but every weapon the revolutionists had in Cavite. He wanted the entire revolutionary army to be disarmed and disbanded. Bonifacio showed the meeting an anonymous letter. It disclosed, he said, that the release of the Spanish prisoners had been part of Aguinaldo’s plan. One of the prisoners, Domingo Martinez, was to deliver to acting Governor General José Lachambre a letter from Aguinaldo confirming the terms of the surrender. This underhand betrayal, Bonifacio added, was the reason

Aguinaldo had been lying low in recent days, pretending to be sick (“*nagsasakit-sakitan*”).¹¹

As Bonifacio hoped, the meeting agreed that the forces of the revolution should be reorganized under a single command in which Aguinaldo would have no part. Forty-two leaders and commanders signed a document, later known as the Naic Military Agreement, which declares that “certain chiefs” – meaning, but not naming, Emilio Aguinaldo and others – had committed treason (“*kataksilan*”) by coming to an agreement with the Spanish enemy (“*pag ayon sa kaauay na Kastila*”) and by destroying the strength that comes from unity (“*pag sira ng matibay na pagkakaisa*”). All officers and troops, the signatories affirm, will be unified, “by persuasion or force,” in a single army under the command of General Pio del Pilar. “We shall recognize no authority,” they pledge, “other than justice, and ...steadfast leaders who from the beginning and until now have not committed Treason....”¹²

It seemed everything had gone according to plan. The meeting had agreed to oust Aguinaldo, and to consolidate the revolutionary army under one of his Magdalo generals. Those who had signed the agreement, and had sworn “before God and our native country” to uphold it “unto the grave,” included Mariano Trias, who had been elected vice-president at Tejeros, and Artemio Ricarte, who had been elected captain general. It seemed Tejeros had finally been buried.



But the success was momentary; it slipped away even before it could be grasped. Lazaro Makapagal, a Magdalo major (*comandante*) who had gone to the *casa hacienda* upon Pio del Pilar’s orders with 60 riflemen, felt uneasy after his troops had been taken upstairs, and he had been left in compound below with Bonifacio’s brother Ciriaco watching over him. Makapagal suspected that his men were being detained, and might be ordered to surrender their rifles. He made a break for it whilst Ciriaco was looking the other way. He jumped over the compound wall and ran off to tell Aguinaldo was happening.¹³

Upon hearing Makapagal’s breathless, startling news, Aguinaldo immediately ordered troops to hasten to the *casa hacienda* and take up positions around the perimeter walls. There they waited, Makapagal says, “for the signal to attack and massacre (“*puksain*”) those who had treacherously captured the Magdalo soldiers.”¹⁴ As soon as he received word that everything was set, Aguinaldo went to the scene. Though still weak from his malaria, he says, he felt strong again. He walked up to the gate with Baldomero Aguinaldo, Tomas Mascardo and a small detachment of troops. The guards halted them, but courteously, and then deferred to Aguinaldo’s demand that they be allowed to enter.¹⁵

Ordering the others to remain in the compound, and only to follow if they heard him fire a single shot, Aguinaldo went into the building and crept up the stairs. Through a small crack in the door he saw the meeting in progress, and listened to what Bonifacio was saying. Procopio Bonifacio caught him eavesdropping, and ushered him into the room. "Everybody was amazed (*"nangagulantang ng lahat"*), Aguinaldo recounts, but Bonifacio invited him to join them. Aguinaldo politely declined, and went to search for the Magdalo troops who had been confined in other rooms and *bodegas*. It was not just Makapagal's 60 riflemen who had been detained, it seems, but also the troops brought to the *casa hacienda* by Pio del Pilar, Mariano Noriel and other Magdalo commanders. Aguinaldo says that all his riflemen (*"lahat nang aking mga kawal na barilan"*) had been locked up. The men he had deployed around the perimeter of the house had been *sandatahan* or *kawal na gulukan*, armed only with blades.¹⁶

As he went around the building releasing the riflemen, Aguinaldo says, a soldier came running with news that Bonifacio and almost everyone else who had been at the meeting had just rushed down the stairs, across the compound and off into the night.¹⁷ Aguinaldo's sudden entrance had astonished and scared them, Makapagal relates; and "the secret power of the meeting evaporated."¹⁸

The memoirs by Aguinaldo and Makapagal are plainly partisan and self-congratulatory. As always, due allowance must be made. Bonifacio and his allies, regrettably, never told their side of the story. Bonifacio did not mention the Naic meeting in the letter he wrote a few days later to Jacinto, and neither did Santiago Alvarez or Artemio Ricarte – two other prominent participants – in their respective memoirs. Gregoria de Jesus mentioned the meeting, but only in a few words: "Pio del Pilar and other leaders went upstairs and appealed for the troops to be brought together under a single command, in order to more effective, and in fact everybody endorsed and signed an agreement to that effect."¹⁹

The sources thus leave many questions unanswered. Bonifacio's authority in Cavite, as he himself recognized, was ebbing away. The plan to depose Aguinaldo can be seen his last attempt to reverse the tide. It ended in a debacle, and the Naic Military Agreement became a dead letter almost before the ink was dry. But it might just have succeeded, because in the likes of Pio del Pilar, Mariano Noriel, Mariano Trias it won surprising, weighty support. Why did these men turn against Aguinaldo, and why did they so abruptly change their minds?²⁰

c.20 Apr Before dawn, Bonifacio leaves Naic together with his wife, his brothers Procopio and Ciriaco, and about 40 Balara men, some of whom have their families with them. Gregoria de Jesus is reportedly seen walking directly behind two Balara men who are carrying a cash box or safe (*"caja de caudales"*).²¹

They go to the neighboring town of Indang, where it seems they initially took up quarters in the *población* – possibly at the barracks previously occupied by the Guardia Civil.²²

c.20-22
Apr

Soon after they arrived in Indang, Gregoria de Jesus recalls, “trouble started because they [the town council] did not want to feed the soldiers,” or would only give them unpolished rice (“*bigas na pinawa*”). One day, she says, the Balara men went out reconnoitering. When they came back, they were told there was no dinner, and they would have to starve until the morning. But then there was no breakfast either. The cook said the town president, Severino de las Alas, had given him an order: if the soldiers wanted food, they should be told to ask their relations. This was not realistic advice. Hungry and angry, the men went to see Bonifacio, and he went to see the town president to protest.²³

That day, Bonifacio’s intervention worked, and the men were able to eat. But the basic problem was not solved, and the relationship between Bonifacio’s group and the town’s leaders and citizens became very tense.

Antonino Guevara, who visited Bonifacio in Indang, noticed that the townspeople “did not trust the Balara troops, especially their Colonel whose name was Pedro Giron and another, said to be a schoolteacher, who surpassed the Guardia Civil in ordering the citizenry about...” The people were also “not really in harmony” (“*hindi nga makakaagpang ng bayan*”) with Bonifacio’s brothers Ciriaco and Procopio. Guevara could not understand Bonifacio’s own intentions in the town. (“*Ang hindi ko lamang maabot ang nilolob niya sa kaniyang katayuan doon sa bayang yaon.*”) A meeting had been held at the Tribunal in an attempt to ease the tensions, but without success. It would not be long, Guevara feared, before there was a big upset (“*hindi dapat magtagal at magkaroon nga ng malaking kagusutan*”).²⁴

c. 22-23
Apr

The frictions worsened. The town president flatly refused to give any more food to Bonifacio’s men. Their arrival in Indang, he told a squad Bonifacio had sent to the Tribunal, had overburdened the town’s limited resources. If they came again to ask for help, he threatened, “something might happen” (“*binantaan pa na may mangyayari kapag umulit na humingi ng abuloy.*”)²⁵

When the men reported back, Bonifacio flew into a rage. “Those brethren are traitors! ... Here we are ready to offer our blood and life itself for the cause of freedom, and what do we get in return? Threats! Tell me, what do we do in the face of such behavior? Burn the town! No mercy! (“*walang patawarin!*”). Begin with the convent and church, so they know what retribution is fitting for those who deny sympathy and succor to the needs of the Motherland! (“*ang ganti ng katwiran sa ayaw magmasakit at tumulong sa pangangailangan ng Inang Bayan!*”).²⁶

Bonifacio’s outburst was overheard by several passers-by. News spread

fast, Alvarez says, that Bonifacio had ordered his men to burn the whole town. His men burnt nothing; they took his words not as commands but as curses. The people of Indang, however, were frightened, and angry.²⁷ The town's leaders positioned cannon (*falconete*) in the plaza, and deployed troops with bolos at key points, ready if necessary to confront Bonifacio's men.²⁸

c. 22-23
Apr Bonifacio and his group leave Indang *población* and move to the barrio of Limbon, about three kilometers to the east, where they constructed a fortified encampment beside a small creek.

Obtaining food for their own needs became less of a problem. They were slightly better off than in the town, Gregoria de Jesus recalled, because people in the barrio had given them rice that was not unpolished ("*bigas na hindi pinawa*").²⁹ Rice and other essentials were also obtained from barrios further afield, in San Francisco de Malabon.³⁰

The supplies, however, were far too limited to meet the demands of another, much larger group that had arrived in the same vicinity. The sources tell us very little about who these people were, or where they came from. "Together with us," Bonifacio wrote to Jacinto, is "a crowd of about a thousand bolomen" ("*Kaakbay rin naman namin ang makapal na sandatahan na may mga isang libo...*").³¹ Alvarez, though, says the multitude also included women, children and elderly people.³² The majority, it might be surmised, were Katipuneros and their relatives who had gone to Cavite to seek refuge from Spanish repression in and around Manila. Most had probably been living in the towns of northern Cavite. When the Spaniards had retaken those towns, the people had retreated with the revolutionary armies to the south, but they now just wanted to go back home.

It is not known whether the *sandatahan* and their relatives had congregated in the Limbon area before Bonifacio's group arrived, or whether they went there at the same time. It is also not clear whether they were camped in the same spot, or some distance away. They hoped, in any event, that Bonifacio and his group would guide them safely out of the war zone, and that in the meantime he would help them get food and other necessities. He had to tell them, regretfully, that he could not. His resources could be stretched only to feed his Balara men and their auxiliaries. Everyone else would have to fend for themselves, to look for their own sustenance. ("*Ang Supremo Bonifacio, na kinakapos sa pagkain ng kanyang mga tao, dahil sa ang kaunting abuloy na kanilang tinanggap ay di makasapat, ay nagpasiyang lahat ng wala sa paglilingkod na kawal ay magsihanap ng malapit na hantungan at ng kanilang kailangan sa kagipitang iyon; sapagka't silang lahat ay nasa gipit na kalagayan...*")³³

c.19-22
Apr In the aftermath of the fateful meeting at the *casa hacienda* in Naic, meanwhile, Aguinaldo moved decisively and adroitly to assert his leadership. He spoke that same night to the two Magdalo generals who

had attended the meeting, Mariano Noriel and Pio del Pilar. They had remained in estate house when Bonifacio and the Magdiwang leaders had suddenly departed. The allegations made by Bonifacio, Aguinaldo assured them, were lies. He forgave the generals. He bore no grudges against them, he said, and would not punish them in any way, not even strip them of their rank.³⁴ Relieved and thankful, they returned ardently to his side.

Some of Bonifacio's closest Magdiwang allies, notably Artemio Ricarte, Ariston Villanueva, Santos Nocon and Diego Mojica, left Naic soon after Bonifacio and his party. This exodus of Aguinaldo's most refractory antagonists made it easier for him to take the next step in consolidating his authority, which was to propitiate Magdiwang president Mariano Alvarez and the other, relatively less refractory, Magdiwang leaders, who had remained in Naic. Meeting them individually and in groups, Aguinaldo was able within the space of two or three days to convince them, as he had convinced his two Magdalo generals, that he was not about to betray the revolution and that he wanted them at this side, serving the nation, in government or in battle.

c. 21
Apr The first tangible sign of Aguinaldo's success in co-opting the Magdiwang leadership was an agreement between him and Mariano Alvarez about getting rice from the neighboring municipality of Tanza.

Tanza was in Magdiwang territory and the *palay* in question was presumably under Magdiwang control, but Alvarez acceded to Aguinaldo's request to make it available to all the Katipunan's troops in the area, Magdalo as well as Magdiwang.³⁵

23 Apr Exactly a month after they had joined Andres Bonifacio in signing the "Acta de Tejeros" nullifying the Tejeros convention, Magdiwang president Mariano Alvarez and secretary Jacinto Lumbreras make a total *volte face*. Aguinaldo's election as "*Presidente*," they accept, had been legitimate after all.

The Magdiwang leaders further agree that Aguinaldo should deal immediately with the business left unfinished at Tejeros, so that the Republic did not have to be held in abeyance any longer. Rather than hold elections to complete the cabinet, they agree, Aguinaldo should appoint whoever he wishes, people he trusts ("*dapat maguing mga taung katiwala ng Presidente*").³⁶

Aguinaldo now felt secure enough to be magnanimous towards his erstwhile opponents. In return for their backing, he assigns four of the five vacant cabinet posts to senior Magdiwang figures. He appoints Mariano Alvarez as *Director de Fomento*; Jacinto Lumbreras as *Director de Estado*; Severino de las Alas as *Director de Gracia y Justicia*; and Pascual Alvarez as *Director de Gobernación*. Three other Magdiwang leaders had already been elected at Tejeros (Mariano Trias as *Vice-Presidente*; Emiliano

Riego de Dios as *Director de Guerra*; and Artemio Ricarte as *General en Jefe*), so in total the Magdiwang filled seven of the nine key posts in the new government. Only the two Aguinaldos (Emilio as *Presidente* and Baldomero as *Director de Hacienda*) had been members of the Magdalo council.

Just a few days earlier, Trias, Ricarte, Mariano Alvarez, Lumbreras and De las Alas had sworn before God to implement the “Naic Military Agreement”. They had plotted to depose Aguinaldo. Now they were ready to swear before God to serve Aguinaldo, their “Illustrious and Distinguished President (*Marilag at Dakilang Presidente*)”.³⁷

24 Apr Mariano Alvarez and the other new ministers swear their oaths of office, and the cabinet holds its first session.³⁸

The revolution was too embattled to allow great celebration, so the Philippine Republic was probably inaugurated without much ceremony. But it was proclaimed, most likely by Aguinaldo himself in front of the crowd that gathered every day in the courtyard of the *casa hacienda*.³⁹

24 Apr As soon as his government is in place, Aguinaldo sends a circular written on notepaper headed “*República de Filipinas – Presidencia*” to the town presidents in all the municipalities that couriers could readily reach.

“Having been elected President of our Nation,” Aguinaldo pronounces, “at a meeting held in [San Francisco de] Malabon on the twenty-second of March, I have begun from this day, the 24th of the present month, to exercise the responsibilities of the aforesaid Office.” “I wish to impress upon you,” Aguinaldo warns the town chiefs, “that if you should fail to give me the assistance which I request of you... I shall consider your indifference to matters affecting our country as a sign of a lack of patriotism, which will be punished with the utmost severity and without delay.”⁴⁰

Aguinaldo also addresses a copy of the circular to Miguel Malvar, the Batangueño leader who some believed was close to Bonifacio.⁴¹

24 Apr Aguinaldo receives reports from Indang president Severino de las Alas and others that Bonifacio and his followers are causing distress and turmoil in the town.⁴²

Bonifacio, the reports say, had threatened to burn down the *población* because his troops had been refused food. Now he was in barrio Limbon, with a thousand people or more. He had told the multitude he could not feed them, and they were getting their own food by whatever means they could. Having little or no money, many either had to starve or to steal. They had raided *palay* stores, thieved fruit and vegetables, and taken away *carabao* and other farm animals to slaughter for their meat. The poor farmers and townspeople were distraught, one prominent citizen wrote;

their livelihoods were being devastated by banditry (“*buhay tulisan*”) and disorder (“*kagulo*”).⁴³

To put a stop to the abuses, Aguinaldo recalls, Severino de las Alas asked him to send troops “to fight the Supremo” (“*humingi ng tropa upang bakahin ang Supremo dahil sa masama niyang ginawa sa taong bayan*”).⁴⁴

24 Apr Bonifacio knows his life is in serious danger - not so much from the Spanish enemy, he confides in a letter to Jacinto, as from the “leaders here, most of whom have wicked intentions” (“*hindi lamang sa kaaway na Kastila nanganganib ang amin buhay kun di lalo’t higit pa sa mga pinuno dito na ang karamiha’y may masasamang kilos*”). “We urgently want to get out of this place” (“*pagpupumilit na mapaalis dito*”), he writes.



Bonifacio tells Jacinto he is camped outside Indang together with about 20 soldiers armed with Remingtons, 20 with muzzle-loaders, and 1,000 or so

bolomen.⁴⁵ Their firm intention is to return to the Manila area (“*na talagang gayak sa pag uwi diyan*”). But he is delaying his departure, he says, until he hears what Jacinto and Julio Nakpil (“*inyo rian*”) think about his plans for mounting an offensive in Laguna.⁴⁶ These plans, Bonifacio fretted, should by now have been explained to Jacinto and Nakpil by his emissary (“*ang inutusan ko*”) Antonino Guevara, who he had sent to visit them a few days previously. But as yet Guevara had not returned with the vital news.⁴⁷

24 Apr Bonifacio sends a similar letter to Julio Nakpil, asking him to send Antonino Guevara back to Cavite immediately, “so that we can take the necessary action as soon as possible (“*upang magawa sa madaling panahon ang nararapat.*”)

The revolutionists in the north, Bonifacio tells Nakpil, should not let their spirits be broken by the Spanish victories in Cavite. His own mood is still optimistic. Overall, he says, the revolution in the south “is spreading and getting much stronger due to the towns of Batangas and Laguna crossing over (“*tumawid*”), and perhaps Tayabas, Mindoro and Camarines will cross over too.”⁴⁸

26 Apr Bonifacio is now isolated in Cavite, practically abandoned by most of his erstwhile Magdiwang allies. The complaints from Indang give Aguinaldo the opportunity to eliminate him, or at least remove him from the scene.

Aguinaldo orders that Bonifacio and his group be arrested and brought to Naic. Their lawlessness in Indang, he felt, was not just unacceptable, it also showed their contempt for the new government’s authority. They were traitors. His ministers and leading advisers, he says, all took the same view.

To implement the arrest order, Aguinaldo assigns three Magdalo colonels to proceed to Limbon with half a battalion of troops – about 300 men. He is anxious about sending such a large force, because the men might be needed at any moment to defend Naic against Spanish attack. But it is Bonifacio’s capture, he decides, that must be his priority.

*(“Ang ginawang kapaslangang...ng Supremo at mga kasamahan napag-tataksil sa Pamahalaan ng himagsikan, ay dinamdang ng lahat kong kasamahan sa bagong pamahalaan, at sa mungkahi ng Secretario de Guerra, Hen Emiliano Riego de Dios, Hen Baldomero Aguinaldo, at Hen Tomas Mascardo na aking sinang-ayunan ay inatasan ko kaagad sina, Koronel Agapito Bonzon, Koronel Ignacio Paua at Koronel Felipe Topacio, na madaling habulin at pabalikin sa Naic ang Supremo Bonifacio at kasamahan nito. Pagdaka’y tinupad ang aking utos at dinala nila ang kalahating batalyong mga kawal, kahi’t agam-agam ang loob ko na baka kami lusubin ng mga kalaban.”)*⁴⁹

27 Apr Bonifacio sends a brief note to the man who had first invited him to Cavite some six months earlier, his wife’s relative, Mariano Alvarez. Seemingly unaware that Alvarez had now abandoned his opposition to the republic, and had accepted a seat in Aguinaldo’s cabinet, Bonifacio beseeches Alvarez to send food supplies to him and his men – “the loyal soldiers of the Mother Country” - without delay, in keeping with a promise he had given a week or so earlier when Bonifacio had left Naic in a state of disquiet (*“bilang katuparan nang pangako niniyong tulong sa aking balisang pag alis.”*)

The behavior of many of Alvarez’s *coprovincianos*, Bonifacio confides, had insulted and pained him deeply; they had shown themselves to be “spurious patriots” (*“bayabayanihan”*).⁵⁰

c.27 Apr Bonifacio is said to have issued an order declaring null and void all appointments of Katipunan leaders in Cavite except Diego Mojica, Santos Nocon, Artemio Ricarte, Silvestre Domingo and a few others.⁵¹ It seems unlikely that this order was ever circulated.

Bonifacio reportedly wanted to warn Emilio Jacinto to “beware of all of them [Aguinaldo’s partisans], because they intended to assassinate him.”⁵²

27 Apr Bonifacio and his close associates were in peril. So why was he still in Cavite, on April 27? Why had he not headed off to Balara, or anywhere else that might have been less dangerous?

On April 24, we noted above, Bonifacio had written to Jacinto and Nakpil saying that he was waiting for his emissary Antonino Guevara to report back to him on whether they thought it would be possible to mount attacks in Laguna. Very soon after Bonifacio had sent those letters, however, perhaps the same day, Guevara did arrive in Limbon, almost certainly bringing the news that Jacinto and Nakpil were not able to send troops to Laguna at that time.⁵³

But still Bonifacio did not leave. He was now waiting for guides (“*magtuturo ng daan*”) who knew a safe route to the north.⁵⁴ This further delay was to cost him his life.

27 Apr Acting on Aguinaldo’s orders, Colonels Agapito Bonzon, José Ignacio Paua and Felipe Topacio head out from Naic with their 300 or so troops to Bonifacio’s encampment in Limbon.⁵⁵ Bonifacio’s group at this time is said to have included only about 35 soldiers with firearms - 20 with Remingtons, 2 with Mausers and the rest with locally made guns.⁵⁶ None of the accounts of what happened on April 27 and 28 mentions the 1,000 bolomen Bonifacio had said were with him on April 24 - perhaps they had left the area due to the lack of food, or perhaps they were in a different camp, in the same vicinity but some distance away.

After Aguinaldo’s troops had surrounded the camp, Colonel Bonzon came with other officers to the house in which the Bonifacio and his wife were staying, greeting them in a peaceable manner. “We have come, sir,” he reportedly said, “to invite you stay, in either Naic or Indang *población* - whichever you prefer - so that we do not become divided.”

“Forgive me if I decline your invitation,” Bonifacio replied, “but I shall never return... first, they cut our food supplies...and secondly the people hereabouts say I should be denied recognition in the province of Cavite because I am a useless man.”⁵⁷

Colonel Bonzon and his companions stayed for a while to eat. They pretended they were going off on a reconnaissance mission, and when they left, Bonifacio later recalled, he gave them some packs of cigarettes. Everything seemed fine - “*naghiualay sila ng mahusay*”.⁵⁸

But soon afterwards Bonifacio got reports that the troops had disarmed and detained some of his men, and had closed the exit from the encampment. Guards had now been posted at the exit, with orders not to allow any member of the family or soldier of Bonifacio to pass, on pain of death.⁵⁹ Bonifacio repeatedly sent word to the troops’ commanders demanding an explanation, but his protests were ignored.⁶⁰

28 Apr “At dawn they started shooting,” Gregoria de Jesus related, “and there was more gunfire away on the other side. I woke him [Bonifacio] up, and when he went downstairs he met a soldier who told him that the commotion had been caused by advancing troops, who he said were already near...[Bonifacio went outside and] ordered our soldiers not to return their fire.... and all our people shouted out [to the troops]: “Brothers, don’t shoot; let us talk in peace about what you want.” (“...*nating kasamahang mga kapatid huag kayong puputok at magusap usap tayong mahusay kung ano ang inyong gusto*”).⁶¹

“But they paid no attention to the shouts,” Gregoria de Jesus related,

“and when they were close they fired a volley at him [Bonifacio].” He was hit in the left arm. When he fell, one of the officers stabbed him in the throat (“*lalamunan*”) and he was beaten with rifle butts. His brother Ciriaco, who reportedly started firing back at the troops, was shot dead. Procopio was beaten and hogtied.⁶²

Aguinaldo’s troops took Andres Bonifacio (in a hammock), his brother Procopio and 20 of his riflemen to Indang *población*. Due to the severity of his wounds, Andres Bonifacio was held overnight at the town tribunal. His wife was permitted to stay with him, but the other prisoners were apparently taken directly to Naic.⁶³

28 Apr Colonel Bonzon reports to Brigadier-General Mariano Noriel on the encounter in Limbon, and Noriel in turn submits a brief written report to Emilio Aguinaldo.⁶⁴

Aguinaldo refers the report back to Noriel, and orders him to appoint an officer with the rank of colonel to investigate the case, interrogate witnesses, including the accused, and then make a recommendation as to whether Andres and Procopio Bonifacio should be put on trial before a Council of War. Noriel appoints Colonel Pantaleon Garcia as the investigator (*juez instructor*).⁶⁵

Aguinaldo’s generals thought the investigation and Council of War were a waste of time. They thought the Bonifacio brothers should be summarily shot, as traitors. (“*Yayamang ang ginawa ng magkapatid ay isang malubhang patataksil sa Pamahalaan ng mga Manghihimagsik, ay marahil na sila’y ipabari na lamang at sukat.*”) Aguinaldo overruled them, saying that criminals were entitled to a fair trial even in a time of war (“*kinakailangang suriin o ipasuri ang pagkakasala ng isang tao nang alinsunod na batas.*”)⁶⁶

29 Apr Aguinaldo’s troops take Bonifacio and his wife from Indang to Naic.⁶⁷

At the army headquarters (“*Bahay Kawal*”) in Naic, Colonel Pantaleon Garcia begins his investigation. He appoints Major Lazaro Makapagal to act as his secretary, and orders that all the soldiers who were with Bonifacio in Limbon be brought in for questioning, even those who had not yet been detained.

On the first day, Garcia questions two prisoners - Benito Torres (a Balara *comandante*) and Procopio Bonifacio.⁶⁸

29 Apr Ariston Villanueva, Diego Mojica and other Magdiwang leaders who had not joined Aguinaldo’s government meet in barrio Malainin, Naic to discuss how to rescue the Bonifacio brothers. They agree that a large force of bolomen (“*gulukan*”) should go to the Naic estate house - where the brothers were being held - on the pretense that they had been sent to reinforce the infantry on guard there. At a given signal, the bolomen would attack the infantrymen, capture their weapons, take control of the

building, and free the prisoners (“*at sa isang hudyat ay magsasabay-sabay ng biglang pagkilos, pag-agaw ng mga baril, ng mga kuta at pagliligtas sa Supremo Bonifacio*”).

The plan is said to have been abandoned because Naic came under Spanish attack in the next few days. But perhaps there were other reasons too. A plot that pitted bolomen against riflemen, the plotters may have been concluded, had very little chance of success. They may also have feared, as Alvarez did, that a rescue attempt could raise the specter of “*guerra civil,*” of “brother fighting brother, when our blood and our lives should be consecrated to no other purpose than the Liberty of the Motherland.”⁶⁹

30 Apr Colonel Garcia interrogates ten more of Bonifacio’s troops. Each of them was asked more or less the same questions – “Did you know there was a revolutionary government and army in the province?”; “Did Bonifacio have authority from the government to have an army?; and “What meetings did Bonifacio have whilst he was in Limbon?” Most of the soldiers replied that they did know a government and army existed, and that they did not know of any authority Bonifacio had been given to organize an army. Some of them said Bonifacio had met the Magdiwang leaders Diego Mojica and Santos Nocon, amongst others.⁷⁰

The most senior of the soldiers, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, was Pedro Giron.⁷¹ He testified that Bonifacio had given him 10 pesos to kill Emilio Aguinaldo if the latter did not agree to submit himself to Bonifacio’s authority.⁷²

1 May The lull in the Spanish offensive ends. The Lachambre division as originally constituted had been dissolved following the fall of Imus, Noveleta and San Francisco de Malabon, but on May 1 the new governor general, Fernando Primo de Rivera, set up his headquarters with a brigade in Silang to augment the brigade based in San Francisco de Malabon.⁷³

Naic, for the past three weeks the “revolutionary capital,” was evidently to be the Spaniards’ next objective. Aguinaldo prepares to defend the town, and orders non-combatants to withdraw to Maragondon, about six kilometers to the southwest. The investigation into Andres and Procopio Bonifacio’s alleged crimes is suspended, and the prisoners are transferred from Naic to Maragondon.

3 May Spanish forces attack and capture Naic, with 400 defenders reportedly killed. The survivors, including Aguinaldo, retreat to join the revolutionists already in Maragondon – their last stronghold.⁷⁴

4 May *Juez instructor* Pantaleon Garcia concludes his investigation by questioning Andres Bonifacio and Gregoria de Jesus.

Bonifacio is described in the record as “President of the Revolution and head (“*puno*”) of the Katipunan”. Asked whether he knows that a government had been formed, and that Aguinaldo had sworn his oath of office as president, he replies that the decisions taken at the Tejeros convention had been annulled, and that he had heard nothing about another government (“*iba pang Pamahalaan*”) having been formed since that time. That being the case, he had not informed any “government” about gathering (“*pagtitipon*”) his troops in Limbon. And, he stressed, they were his own troops, who he had brought to Cavite in the first place. The Magdiwang council, he said, was aware he was preparing to leave the province with his troops.

Bonifacio was also questioned about the firearms his troops had with them in Limbon. On the first day of the investigation, Garcia had asked for these guns to be inventoried, and they comprised 14 Remington rifles, 2 Mauser rifles, and 12 less powerful weapons, mostly shotguns. On two of the rifles the “Magdalo” mark was visible. Bonifacio replied that he believed the weapons were all his, but in any event he had brought many more rifles into the province – about 50 – than his riflemen carried when they were intending to leave.

Bonifacio denied he had ever spoken to Pedro Giron about killing Aguinaldo. He asked for the opportunity to confront Giron face-to-face, according to Gregoria de Jesus, but was told this was impossible because Giron had been killed in combat just a day or so after he had given his testimony. This was a lie. Giron was still alive.⁷⁵

Asked about an allegation that he had bribed army officers (“*pinuno ng kawal*”) to join him, Bonifacio said the P200 he had distributed was a reward (“*pala*”) for the troops who had fought valiantly in the battles at Noveleta and San Francisco de Malabon. He had distributed the money in front of many witnesses, and had asked the officers to tell Emilio Aguinaldo (as Magdalo captain general) what he had done.⁷⁶

4 May Garcia calls as his final witness Gregoria de Jesus. He asks her whether she knew there was a President of the archipelago (“*sangkapuluan*”), and she answers “No”.

When her interrogation was finished, Gregoria de Jesus complained that after the bloody encounter in Limbon she had been abused by Colonel Agapito Bonzon, the joint commander of the detachment sent by Aguinaldo. First he had threatened to have her tied to a tree and beaten if she did not answer his questions; then he had forced her to enter a vacant house and had asked her for her gold engagement ring, twelve pesos and some revolver bullets; and then he had forced her into another house whose occupants had been ordered to leave (“*ay pinipilit siang dalhin sa bahay na ualang tao at noon ding oras nasyon ay ipinakuha ng nasabing Koronel [Bonzon] ang isang singsing na kompromisong tumbaga, labing dalauang piso at bala ng Revolver, ng makalabas na sia ng daan ay may isang bahay na*

pinapapanaog na lahat ang tao at ipinapapanhik ang nagsasaysay...")⁷⁷

Through his counsel, Bonifacio later asked that Colonel Bonzon be investigated for attempting to dishonor his wife. It is not known whether any investigation was made.⁷⁸

4 May

Juez instructor Garcia forwards the witness statements to Emilio Aguinaldo. In his covering note, Garcia summarizes the allegations against the Bonifacio brothers, and implicitly accepts them all.⁷⁹

Garcia specifically reiterates Pedro Giron's claim that Bonifacio had given him 10 pesos to assassinate Aguinaldo – a claim that General Noriel had omitted from the list of charges he put to the *Consejo* on May 6, perhaps because he considered it implausible.

Garcia also reinforces Giron's testimony about Bonifacio inducing ("*nagudioc*") army officers to switch to his side. These allegations, says Garcia, had been corroborated by "Pio del Pilar, Colonel Ritual and others, who had spoken about the matter in the presence of many" ("*at sa mga bagay na ito manga capag sasabi sina G. Pio del Pilar, Coronel Ritual at iba't, iba pa sapagcat silay nag pahayag sa harap ng marami.*") Del Pilar and Ritual did not appear as witnesses at the formal hearings, and their statements are not mentioned anywhere else in the trial documents. Were the statements made under oath, the historian Carlos Quirino asks, "or were they private declarations made with no legal force and effect? The conclusion is inescapable that Bonifacio was convicted by *ex-parte* testimony."⁸⁰

Garcia formally recommends that a "*Consejo de Guerra* should be convoked to pass judgment."⁸¹

Emilio Aguinaldo forwards the documents to General Mariano Noriel, the president of the Council of War.⁸² Noriel decides the Council will convene the next day.⁸³

5 May

The Council of War meets in the large upstairs *sala* of a private house in Maragondon. General Mariano Noriel presides, and the six other members of the council sit alongside him – Tomas Mascardo (also a Magdalo general); Sulpicio P. Antony; Estevan Infante; Mariano Riego de Dios; Crisostomo Riel; and Placido Martinez. To their left are seated "the gentlemen for the prosecution," led by José Elises, and to their right are "the gentlemen for the defense" – Placido Martinez and Teodoro Gonzales. The trial is held in public, and the room is packed. The prisoners are fetched.



The Council first asks the secretary to the investigation, Major Lazaro

Macapagal, to read out (“*binasa ng buong lacas*”) the witness statements and other documents. This must have taken quite a long time.⁸⁴

José Elises then makes the case for the prosecution. Andres Bonifacio, he says, planned to overthrow the revolutionary government; induced Pedro Giron to assassinate the president; and ordered his soldiers to be ready to open fire on government troops. Procopio was his accomplice. They were traitors (“*tacsil*”). They deserved to be shot, he specified in precise detail, “by musketry in a public place, five rounds for each of the brothers at a distance of ten paces in accordance with the gravity of their crimes”. (“*...ipa baril sa isang lansangan hayag hangang limang putoc bauat isa sa mag capatid, layong sampung hacbang sang ayon sa bigat ng canilang casalanan*”).⁸⁵

It fell to Placido Martinez to respond in Andres Bonifacio’s defense. He did not dispute Bonifacio’s guilt. Plotting to kill the president, he agreed, was indeed a terrible crime, “like desiring the murder of us all.” Nevertheless, he argued, the “Kartilya” of the Katipunan taught us to “love our fellow men as we love ourselves,” and the Lord’s Prayer taught us to “forgive those who trespass against us.” This did not mean Bonifacio should not be punished. But, he ventured, “there might be a severe punishment other than death that would be fitting” (“*cung may ibang parusa matindi bucod sa camatayan, ay dapat paring ilapat sa cania*”).⁸⁶

Procopio Bonifacio’s assigned defender, Teodoro Gonzales, then spoke. Procopio, he said, had not induced anyone to assassinate Aguinaldo; he knew nothing about plans to overthrow the government; and he had not resisted the government’s troops in Limbon. Gonzales accordingly urged the council to rescue (“*iligtas*”) Procopio from the penalty the prosecutor had demanded.⁸⁷

At this juncture, Andres Bonifacio asked to speak. His request was granted, says the trial record, but he then “related once more what he had related in his declaration and, at the request of the people, he was forbidden to go on, and because he insisted he was once more forbidden.” (“*Sa ganitong pagpupulong ay hiniling ni G. Andres Bonifacio, na siya, i, pahintulutang makapangusap na pinag calooban siya at isinalaysay niyang muli ang nasasalaysay sa caniang declaracion, at sa cahilingan ng bayan, pinag baulan siya na makapanilita at sapagka,t, nag pupumilit pinag baulang muli.*”)⁸⁸

General Noriel then declared the session closed.

6 May The Council of War meets to discuss its judgment. General Noriel asks his colleagues a series of questions about the charges against the defendants. They respond, unanimously, as follows:

- Andres Bonifacio did know that a government existed in the archipelago and that it was based in Cavite.

- Andres Bonifacio did not have permission from the government to assemble soldiers, to hold firearms, or to detain people in the barrio of Limbon.
- Andres Bonifacio and his brothers Procopio and Ciriaco did order their soldiers to be prepared to fire on government troops.⁸⁹
- Andres Bonifacio did entice commanders of the government's troops to go over to his side together with their arms, and did give money to said commanders in the town of Naic ("*si G. Andres ay umudiok sa mga Pinuno ng kaul nitong Pamahala-an na sila'y, lumipat sa cania sampu ng mga baril; ...[at] si Guinoong Andres ay nag bigay ng salapi sa mga naturang pinuno sa bayang Naic*").
- Andres Bonifacio and his brothers had fought the government troops who had gone to their encampment in Limbon.
- Andres Bonifacio and his brothers were staying in Limbon and assembling troops for the purpose of rebelling against the government ("*ang nasa nila ay mag hihimagsik laban dito sa Pamahala-an*").

In view of these actions, the Council concludes, the fitting ("*nauuicol*") sentence for Andres and Procopio Bonifacio was death.⁹⁰

Most historians agree that Andres Bonifacio and his brother were not given a fair hearing. The Council of War, says Teodoro Kalaw, "could be charged with partiality because it was composed of men of only one side."⁹¹ Two of its members - Mariano Noriel, its president, and Tomas Mascardo - were senior Magdalo generals, and had probably been among the generals who, Aguinaldo recalls, believed the Bonifacio brothers should have been shot without trial. The other members of the *Consejo* were mostly prominent citizens of Maragondon, a town that was nominally in the Magdiwang zone but whose Katipunan leaders had switched their allegiance to Aguinaldo long before the Republic had been proclaimed on April 24.

Teodoro Agoncillo concurs that "the prosecutors were in a prejudiced frame of mind". The documents, he says, give the impression that "nothing could have saved the brothers from the verdict of death." The trial, he starkly concludes, "was a farce".⁹² Even Carlos Quirino, generally sympathetic to Aguinaldo, concedes that the outcome was a "gross miscarriage of justice".⁹³

The same verdict is reached by Abraham Sarmiento, a former Supreme Court justice who examined the trial documents from a legal standpoint. The charges, he observes, were not substantiated by sufficient evidence. The Bonifacio brothers were therefore "deprived of due process of law". They "should have been acquitted".⁹⁴

The Bonifacio brothers were not given a proper opportunity to challenge or refute the allegations. The *Consejo* adopted Spanish military rules and conventions, which meant the Bonifacio brothers were not allowed to confront or cross-examine the witnesses.⁹⁵ Placido Martinez, the counsel assigned to Andres Bonifacio, was hopeless. His appeal, in Justice Sarmiento's words, "was not only in violation of [a lawyer's] sworn duty to 'serve his client with competence and diligence,' it was an act that came on the edge of bad faith."⁹⁶ And as Quirino points out, Martinez's designation as a defense counsel when he was actually a member of the *Consejo de Guerra* was, "to say the least, anomalous."⁹⁷ Even the counsel assigned to Procopio, the trial record suggests, did nothing more than flatly deny the charges against his client.

Andres Bonifacio, as noted, responded to the charge of treason against Aguinaldo's government by saying he did not know a government had been formed, or that Aguinaldo was its president. Yes, he answered the *juez instructor*, he did indeed recall what had happened at the Tejeros convention. It had been disorderly ("*nagulo*") and without any outcome ("*hualang kinalabasan*").⁹⁸

If Bonifacio been given the opportunity to say more, or if he had been assigned a competent defense counsel, this line of argument could have been pursued more forcefully. Aguinaldo and his allies, Bonifacio could have said, had themselves publicly announced that the proceedings at Tejeros on March 22 and Tanza on March 23 had been nullified, and that consequently the leadership of the revolution had not changed.⁹⁹

That was still the case, Bonifacio could have said, when he left the town of Naic on April 20 or thereabouts. It was therefore still the case in the days prior to his departure, when he had persuaded some of the army officers then in Naic to "switch sides".

This allegation referred to Bonifacio's plan to unify the Katipunan's armed forces under the command of General Pio del Pilar, the plan that culminated in the abortive Naic Military Agreement. The men who prosecuted the Bonifacio brothers did not refer specifically to the Naic Military Agreement; nor to the meeting in the *casa hacienda* in Naic at which it had been signed. Probing into the matter, they must have realized, would have been awkward. One of the Magdalo officers who had attended the fateful meeting, after all, had been none other than Mariano Noriel, who now sat in judgment on the Bonifacios as president of the *Consejo de Guerra*. The signatories to the Agreement had included Mariano Trias, elected at Tejeros as Aguinaldo's vice president, and Artemio Ricarte, elected as captain general.

Bonifacio could have opened this can of worms, had he been given the chance. If his plan to unite the Katipunan army had been treasonous, he might have asked, why had figures like Noriel, Trias, Ricarte been

involved? Were they traitors too? If so, why weren't they also on trial for their lives? But no, Bonifacio could have argued, they were not traitors, because they knew, just as he knew, that the government discussed at Tejeros and Tanza had not come into being.

By the time of his trial, if not sooner, Bonifacio must have learned that on April 24 the Republic had been proclaimed and Aguinaldo had announced his assumption of presidential powers. With the assent of the Magdiwang leaders, Aguinaldo had revalidated the Tejeros elections he had previously declared void. Bonifacio, of course, believed Tejeros had been consigned to oblivion for all time, never to be resurrected. But the fact that Aguinaldo had not assumed office until April 24, he might have argued in his defense, proved there had been no government before then. How could treason be committed against a government that did not exist? By the time the government had been formed, Bonifacio could have said, he and his brothers were already encamped peaceably with their group in Limbon, waiting only for the arrival of guides who could lead them safely out of Cavite.

7 May The documents of the investigation and the Council of War's judgment are transmitted to Emilio Aguinaldo, and he in turn transmits them to the *auditor*, his cousin Baldomero Aguinaldo.¹⁰⁰

8 May Baldomero Aguinaldo, like Council of War president Mariano Noriel and member Tomas Mascardo, was a senior Magdalo general, and he too had probably been among the generals who, his cousin Emilio recalls, believed the Bonifacio brothers should have been shot without trial. When "auditing" the case documents, he added a little embroidery of his own. Andres and Procopio Bonifacio, he says, had assembled soldiers in Limbon in order to overthrow the government and kill the president. This had been confirmed, he lied, by Bonifacio's "own men, Pedro Giron, Benito Torres, Bibiano Rojas and others whose names are too numerous to mention here." In truth, these allegations had been made by a single witness - Pedro Giron, the self-purported non-assassin.


Baldomero Aguinaldo concurs that the death sentence imposed by the *Consejo de Guerra* is "appropriate," but advises Emilio Aguinaldo that "You, sir, should decide on what is proper" ("*Ikao po ang lalong bahalang magpapasiya ng nararapat.*")¹⁰¹

Emilio Aguinaldo says in his memoirs that he pitied the condemned men. He also wanted the stain ("*dungis*") of disunity in revolutionary ranks to be concealed, and he thought their deaths would serve no purpose ("*walang kapararakan*").¹⁰² He accordingly decided "to pardon Andres Bonifacio and Procopio Bonifacio from the penalty of death and to change the sentence to indefinite exile, "to be served in a suitable place where they will be guarded by prison officials and not allowed to talk to each other and likewise to other persons..."¹⁰³

Lazaro Makapagal formally notifies the Bonifacio brothers that their death sentence has been commuted.¹⁰⁴

8-9 May As soon as Aguinaldo's commutation order became known, Generals Mariano Noriel and Pio del Pilar rushed to his headquarters and pleaded with him to change his mind. The death sentence had to be upheld, they argued, "if you want to maintain the stability of the Revolutionary Government, sir, and if you want us to stay alive."¹⁰⁵

Other revolutionists forcefully voiced the same view, and ultimately Aguinaldo was persuaded.¹⁰⁶ He decided to order General Noriel to implement the decision of the Council of War, and to have the Bonifacio brothers shot, he later said, "for the sake of the country" ("*iniatas ko kay Heneral Noriel na ipatupad ang kahatulan ng Consejo de Guerra, na barilin ang magkapatid; alang-alan sa kapakanan ng Bayan.*")¹⁰⁷



Ita, na mabaito iina Heneral Mariano Noriel, Heneral Pio del Pilar, na mga Kapawat ng Consejo de Guerra, ay dahil dahil sa binawagan ang ating pansing at sinabing, "kung ibig po ninyo mag patulay ang kapakanan ng ating kamakalayan na pagluhimagsit, at kung ibig ninyong mabuhay po kayo, ay magkapatid na ipatupad ang kahatulan ng Consejo de Guerra, na barilin ang magkapatid; alang-alan sa kapakanan ng Bayan."

Aguinaldo
Kavit, Kabite, 22, Marso, 1948.

Andres and Procopio Bonifacio were not told that the commutation order had been rescinded.

8-9 May Gregoria de Jesus wasn't told either, but she had a foreboding the death sentence might be reinstated, and she was extremely anxious. She asked various chiefs ("*ibang pinuno*") what was to happen, and they told her not to worry.

On the evening of May 9, whilst she was at the house where her husband and brother-in-law were detained, a detachment of troops arrived with orders to take the two prisoners away. Gregoria beseeched the *comandante* - Lazaro Makapagal - to wait until the morning because it was teeming with rain and her husband was sick. Makapagal said he had to follow his orders. She persisted. The only way she could get the order changed, she was told, was to make her plea to Aguinaldo himself. In that case, she said, she would try. With two women companions she walked and scrambled through the darkness and rain to Aguinaldo's house.

When she got there, Aguinaldo's staff told her she couldn't see him. They told her he was unwell and sleeping, but that was a lie. She could hear Aguinaldo talking to someone in his room. Anyway, she was told,

Makapagal's orders would not be changed. She was placed under guard and taken first to the Tribunal, and then to the town president's house. To prevent her from causing any further trouble, she was kept there under house arrest until the following afternoon.¹⁰⁸

10 May Early in the morning, General Mariano Noriel summoned Major Lazaro Makapagal and ordered him to get four riflemen from the barracks. Makapagal and the riflemen were then to collect the Bonifacio brothers and take them, with the aid of a guide, to the foot of Mount Tala to the south of Maragondon. Noriel gave the major a sealed envelope which he said contained further instructions, but which was not to be opened until the group had reached "Maytala". Makapagal was then to read the note aloud, so the prisoners could hear.¹⁰⁹

After getting the riflemen, Makapagal proceeds to the place ("Ermita," he recalls) where the brothers are detained. He tells them they are to be taken to Mount Tala, and orders them to prepare for the trip at once. They hastily gather some clothes, and the group sets off.

General Noriel presumably wanted the Bonifacios (and perhaps even Makapagal) to believe they were being conducted to their place of exile, or perhaps just being taken away from the battle zone – the Spanish attack on Maragondon began that very day. But the brothers would surely have been very apprehensive, just as Gregoria de Jesus was.

After they had walked for an hour or so, the brothers asked to rest for a while, and the group sat down at the foot of a hill. Andres Bonifacio then asked Makapagal to open the sealed envelope. Makapagal agreed, and read the note out loud. Andres and Procopio Bonifacio, it said, were to be shot to death, as decided by the Council of War. It ordered Makapagal to carry out the sentence, and warned him he would be court-martialed if he did not. It was signed by General Mariano Noriel.

Procopio was shot first, and then Andres. They were buried in shallow graves dug with bolos and bayonets, and covered with soil and twigs.

10 May Gregoria de Jesus was released from house arrest in Maragondon at about the same time as her husband and brother-in-law were killed. She hurried off immediately in the direction they had been taken, and met Makapagal and the riflemen as they were coming back. Together with them was one of Aguinaldo's advisers, Clemente José Zulueta, and a Spanish prisoner, a *cazador* named Juan Marinio, who was carrying her husband's clothes and shoes.¹¹⁰

She asked them what had happened. They told her they had left the brothers in the mountains, in the house of a *teniente del barrio*. She asked them why they were carrying her husband's clothes. They told her that he wanted her to bring them to him.¹¹¹

Bonifacio's executioners were not even able to tell her what they had done. They left her with the false hope that he was still alive, and let her roam for days and weeks in the mountains, vainly searching for him.¹¹²

Gregoria wrote about the tragedy whilst her pain was still fresh and raw. "Ay my brothers! Just think, brothers, whether or not there was justice in the cruelty they committed against us." (*"Ay mga kapd. kaya isipin ninyo mga kapd. kung katoiran o hindi ang kanilang ginagawa pag api sa amin."*)¹¹³

Jim Richardson
Revised April 2021





Detail from "Provincia de Cavite y Region Limitrofe" (1897) [Biblioteca Virtual de Defensa]

PICTURE SOURCES

- Andres Bonifacio – Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla
- Andres Bonifacio, appointment of Emilio Jacinto – researchgate.net
- Miguel Malvar – rappler.com
- Andres Bonifacio, Letterhead, April 16, 1897 – Xiao Chua
- Naic Military Agreement – Leon Gallery
- Andres Bonifacio, Letterhead, April 24, 1897 – Xiao Chua
- Bonifacio Trial House, Maragondon – National Historical Commission of the Philippines
- Emilio Aguinaldo, signed statement – Teodoro Agoncillo, *Revolt of the Masses*
- Bonifacio statue (Monumento) – traveleronfoot

NOTES

- ¹ Andres Bonifacio, Notice of appointment, April 15, 1897, in Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1956), 187.
- ² Glenn Anthony May, *Battle for Batangas: A Philippine province at war* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), 58; Doroteo Abaya and Bernard Karganilla, *Miguel Malvar and the Philippine Revolution* (Manila [?]: Miguel Malvar (MM) Productions, 1998), 51; 69.
- ³ Artemio Ricarte confirms he went to Batangas around this time, but it seems he did not leave Cavite until a few days after the April 16 date of Bonifacio's letter – he was a signatory to the “Naic Military Agreement,” which according to Aguinaldo was written on April 19. Artemio Ricarte, *Himagsikan nang manga Pilipino laban sa Kastila*. (Yokohama: Karihan Café, 1927), 68-9; Emilio Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita ng himagsikan* (Manila: Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, 1964), 206.
- ⁴ Andres Bonifacio, Letter to Emilio Jacinto, April 16, 1897, in Adrian E. Cristobal, *The Tragedy of the Revolution* (Makati City: Studio 5 Publishing Inc., 1997), 146-47.
- ⁵ Miguel Malvar, Letter to Emilio Aguinaldo, April 14, 1897 [Philippine Insurgent Records, AGO 460111-17; Microfilm reel 84]; Miguel Malvar, Letter to Emilio Aguinaldo, April 17, 1897 [Philippine Revolutionary Records, P7] cited in May, *Battle for Batangas*, 58-9; Santiago Rillo de Leon, Letter to Emilio Aguinaldo, April 14, 1897 [Philippine Insurgent Records, Books A.4; Microfilm reel 83].
- ⁶ Andres Bonifacio, Letter to Emilio Jacinto, April 16, 1897, in Cristobal, *Tragedy of the Revolution*, 146-7.
- ⁷ Andres Bonifacio, Letter to Julio Nakpil, April 24, 1897 [Archivo General Militar de Madrid: Caja 5677, leg.1.129].
- ⁸ The essence of Bonifacio's case has been paraphrased here from an unsympathetic source – Emilio Aguinaldo's own memoirs. Aguinaldo's recollection is nevertheless compatible with what we know from other sources about Bonifacio's thoughts and feelings in mid-April 1897. Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 201.
- ⁹ The declaration Cayetano Topacio made when the case was investigated is kept in the Madrid military archives, but none of the other case papers. The formal outcome of the investigation is not known. Cayetano Topacio, Declaration dated April 10, 1897 [Archivo General Militar de Madrid: Caja 5677, leg.1.129].
- ¹⁰ Bonifacio, Letter to Emilio Jacinto, April 24, 1897, in Cristobal, *Tragedy of the Revolution*, 146-7.
- ¹¹ Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 201.
- ¹² Andres Bonifacio and others, Declaration, c. April 19, 1897 (“The Naic Military Agreement”). [Private collection]. Isagani Medina includes a more-or-less accurate version of the Tagalog text in his edition of Carlos Ronquillo's memoir, but he modernizes its orthography – “*binago ko ang pagbaybay*.” Carlos Ronquillo, *Ilang talata tungkol sa paghihimagsik nang 1896-1897*, edited by Isagani R. Medina (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1996), 109-12.
- ¹³ Lazaro Makapagal, Untitled memoir in Tagalog, c.1930s, in Pedro S. de Achutegui SJ and Miguel A. Bernad SJ, *Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896: A documentary history* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila, 1972), Achutegui and Bernad, 198-205. It is Aguinaldo's account that says the meeting was held on April 19.
- ¹⁴ From the memoirs of Makapagal and Aguinaldo it is not entirely clear what the conspirators at the *casa hacienda* hoped to achieve by detaining the Magdalo soldiers – perhaps they intended that General Pio del Pilar would shortly address them all, and convince them to join the ranks of the new army under his command.
- ¹⁵ Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 200.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 201-2; Lazaro Makapagal, Untitled memoir, as cited, 367; 370; Lazaro Makapagal, “Biografía de Andres Bonifacio,” in Dalomag [Emilio Aguinaldo], “Sa pinakamahalagang kabuhayan ng ama ng Katipunan, dakilang Andres Bonifacio,” unpublished typescript, 1948, n.pp.
- ¹⁷ Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 203.
- ¹⁸ Lazaro Makapagal, Untitled memoir in Tagalog, as cited, 369.
- ¹⁹ Gregoria de Bonifacio, “Kasulatan” sent to Emilio Jacinto, c. June 1897. Transcription by Ambeth R. Ocampo from a photocopy of the document, appended to his “Andres Bonifacio: Mito o Realidad?” First Annual Andres Bonifacio/ Parian Lectures, Bulwagang Katipunan, Manila City Hall, November 29, 1989 (mimeograph), n.pp.
- ²⁰ In 1907, Aguinaldo hinted at a financial explanation. Bonifacio, he wrote, “held the revolutionary funds, which then amounted to P18,000 pesos, with the result that the soldiers in his section of the country received their scant pay with some regularity while Magdalo, almost without funds, could only pay its men at irregular intervals. The fighting men were therefore eager to serve under Bonifacio.” Aguinaldo did not repeat this assertion in his later memoirs, and corroboration has not been found in other sources. In the absence of

alternative explanations, however, it is possible that funds were a critical factor. "Statement of Emilio Aguinaldo regarding the revolutionary movement in Cavite and the death of Andres Bonifacio," November 9, 1907, in *Memoirs of General Artemio Ricarte*, Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1963), 225.

²¹ Makapagal, "Biografía de Andrés Bonifacio," as cited.

²² Antonino Guevara, "Unang Bugso ng Panghihimagsik," in Dalomag [Emilio Aguinaldo], "Sa pinakamahalagang kabuhayan," as cited.

²³ De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited.

²⁴ Guevara, "Unang Bugso ng Panghihimagsik," as cited.

²⁵ Santiago V. Alvarez, *The Katipunan and the Revolution: Memoirs of a General* [1927], translated by Paula Carolina S. Malay (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992), 332.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 209.

²⁹ De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited.

³⁰ Julian Aguila and Domingo San Juan, Declarations dated April 30, 1897 in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents in Tagalog text and English translation*, translated by Virginia Palma-Bonifacio (Manila: Ateneo de Manila, 1963), 15A; 24-24A (page numbers refer to the original documents, which are reproduced in the appendix).

³¹ Bonifacio, Letter to Emilio Jacinto, April 24, 1897, as cited.

³² Alvarez, *The Katipunan and the Revolution*, 331.

³³ Ibid., 331-2.

³⁴ Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 204-5.

³⁵ Antonio Virata, Letter to Mariano Noriel, April 22, 1897 [Philippine Insurgent Records, AGO 460111-145. (Microfilm reel 84)]. Written exactly one month after the Tejeros convention, this letter still refers to Aguinaldo as the "Pangulong Digma sa Magdalo," not as "Presidente".

³⁶ M.A. Mainam (Mariano Alvarez) and others, Declaration dated Naic, April 23, 1897 [Philippine Insurgent Records, AGO 460111-125 (Microfilm reel 84)]. The other signatories were Vice-President-elect Mariano Trias (who as member of the Magdiwang Council himself may have acted as a mediator on Aguinaldo's behalf), Jacinto Lumbreras, Pascual Alvarez, Cornelio Magsarili, and Ambrosio Mojica.

³⁷ Signed oaths of office dated Naic, April 24, 1897 [Philippine Insurgent Records, AGO 460111-173 (Mariano Alvarez); AGO 460111-174 (Emiliano Riego de Dios); AGO 460111-176 (Pascual Alvarez); and AGO 460111-177 (Jacinto Lumbreras). (All on Microfilm reel 84)]. Severino de las Alas took his oath of office two days later.

³⁸ Draft minutes of cabinet meeting, April 24, 1897 [Philippine Insurgent Records, AGO 460111-190 (Microfilm reel 84)].

³⁹ Ronquillo, *Ilang talata*, 511.

⁴⁰ Emilio Aguinaldo, Circular to town presidents, April 24, 1897 [Philippine Insurgent Records, AGO 460111-197 (Microfilm reel 84)].

⁴¹ Emilio Aguinaldo, Letter to the President of the Regional Government of Batangas, April 24, 1897 [Philippine Insurgent Records, AGO 460111-22 (Microfilm reel 84)].

⁴² Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 209; Ricarte, *Himagsikan*, 70.

⁴³ Pepe [José Coronel] to Miong [Emilio Aguinaldo], circa April 24, 1897 [Philippine Insurgent Records, AGO 460111-63 (Microfilm reel 84)]. The document bears the date "24-3-97," but this must be an error.

⁴⁴ Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita ng himagsikan*, 209.

⁴⁵ Bonifacio, Letter to Emilio Jacinto, April 24, 1897, as cited. In the body of his letter, Bonifacio says he is "Halang," but above his signature he gives his location as "Limbon". This could conceivably mean he started the letter in one place and finished it in another, but in any event the two barrios are only a couple of kilometers apart.

⁴⁶ Bonifacio, Letter to Emilio Jacinto, April 24, 1897, as cited; Bonifacio, Letter to Julio Nakpil, April 24, 1897, as cited. The letter to Jacinto refers only in general terms to "what we are planning," but the letter to Nakpil refers specifically to "our planned attack in Silangan," meaning Laguna.

⁴⁷ Once again, the exact sequence of events here is uncertain, and puzzling. The letter Bonifacio gave to Guevara to take to Jacinto is dated "Naic, April 16, 1897," but Guevara might not have left Naic for Pasig until a few days later. Guevara was one of the signatories to the "Naic Military Agreement," which most historians say (following Aguinaldo) was drawn up on the evening of April 19. If Guevara did not leave Naic until April 20, however, the "delay" in his return that worried Bonifacio can only have been brief. In his own memoir, Guevara gives a very interesting account of his trip to Pasig, but his chronology, alas, is confused to the point of being self-contradictory. The best guess we can make is that Guevara reached

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- Limbon and reported back on his mission very soon after Bonifacio had despatched his follow-up letter to Jacinto on April 24, perhaps that same day. Guevara, "Unang Bugso ng Panghihimagsik," as cited.
- ⁴⁸ Bonifacio, Letter to Julio Nakpil, April 24, 1897, as cited.
- ⁴⁹ Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 209.
- ⁵⁰ Andres Bonifacio, Note to Mariano Alvarez, April 27, 1897, in José P. Santos, *Si Bonifacio at ang himagsikan* (Manila: n.pub, 1935), 26. This note has to be regarded with a little caution because neither the original nor photographs can now be found. Its content, however, does not give any reason to doubt its authenticity.
- ⁵¹ Antonino Guevara, Letter to Emilio Jacinto, May 3, 1897, quoted in Epifanio de los Santos, "Andres Bonifacio" [Spanish version], *Philippine Review (Revista Filipina)*, II:11 (November 1917), 74. The full text of this letter has regrettably never been published, and the letter's present whereabouts are unknown. It was sold at an auction held by the Bayanihan Collectors Club in 2011.
- ⁵² De los Santos, "Andres Bonifacio," 74.
- ⁵³ Guevara, "Unang Bugso ng Panghihimagsik," as cited.
- ⁵⁴ Procopio Bonifacio, Declaration dated April 29, 1897; and Andres Bonifacio, Declaration dated May 4, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio*, 8A and 27A. Procopio specifies in his declaration that the guides were to lead the group to Balara.
- ⁵⁵ Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 209.
- ⁵⁶ Benito Torres, Declaration dated April 29, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 6.
- ⁵⁷ Antonino Guevara, Letter to Emilio Jacinto, May 3, 1897, as cited.
- ⁵⁸ Andres Bonifacio, Declaration dated May 4, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 29.
- ⁵⁹ De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited.
- ⁶⁰ Andres Bonifacio, Declaration dated May 4, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 29.
- ⁶¹ De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*; Andres Bonifacio, Declaration dated May 4, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 30a. Colonel Bonzon's version of events was very different – Bonifacio, he said, had "acted in the hostile manner of an enemy, and ordered his men to fire. Our men were forced to fire back..." Three of Bonifacio's group (Benito Torres, Pedro Giron and Bibiano Rojas) later testified that Ciriaco Bonifacio had been the first to fire, but two others (Antonino Guevara and Francisco Carreon) recalled it had been Aguinaldo's troops. Testimonies of Benito Torres (April 29), Bibiano Rojas (April 30) and Pedro Giron (April 30) in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 5a, 19, 22a; Antonino Guevara, Letter to Emilio Jacinto, May 3, 1897, as cited; and Francisco Carreon, "Maikling salaysay ng aking buhay" (ms; n.d) cited in Agoncillo, *Revolt of the Masses*, 240.
- ⁶³ Mariano Noriel, Note to Emilio Aguinaldo, April 28, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 1-2.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁵ Emilio Aguinaldo, Order dated April 28, 1897, in *ibid.*, 2a; Mariano Noriel, Note dated April 28, 1897, in *ibid.*, 3-3a.
- ⁶⁶ Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 212-5.
- ⁶⁷ De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited; Pantaleon Garcia, *Maikling kasaysayan ng himagsikan sa Pilipinas* (Maynila: Imprenta de 'Dalaga', 1930), 10.
- ⁶⁸ Benito Torres and Procopio Bonifacio, Declarations dated April 29, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 5-9.
- ⁶⁹ Alvarez, *The Katipunan and the Revolution*, 337.
- ⁷⁰ *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 10-26.
- ⁷¹ Benito Torres, Declaration dated April 29, 1897, in *ibid.*, 6; Procopio Bonifacio, Declaration dated April 29, 1897, in *ibid.*, 8; Julian Aguila, Declaration dated April 30, 1897, in *ibid.*, 15a.
- ⁷² Pedro Giron, Declaration dated April 30, 1897, in *ibid.*, 21. Gregoria de Jesus alleges that Pedro Giron was bribed to testify against Bonifacio and threatened with execution if he did not. De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited.
- ⁷³ Marconi M. Dioso, *A Trilogy of Wars*, (Pittsburgh: Dorrance Publishing Co., 2004), 192-3.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 199-200.
- ⁷⁵ De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited.
- ⁷⁶ Andres Bonifacio, Declaration dated May 4, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 27-31.
- ⁷⁷ Gregoria de Jesus, Declaration dated May 4, 1897, in *ibid.*, 32a-33a.
- ⁷⁸ Consejo de Guerra, Record of Proceedings, May 5, 1897, in *ibid.*, 38.

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- ⁷⁹ Pantaleon Garcia, Note to Emilio Aguinaldo dated May 4, 1897, in *ibid.*, 35-35a.
- ⁸⁰ Carlos Quirino, "Historical Introduction," in *ibid.*, 25.
- ⁸¹ Pantaleon Garcia, Note to Emilio Aguinaldo dated May 4, 1897, in *ibid.*, 35.
- ⁸² Emilio Aguinaldo, Note dated May 4, 1897 in *ibid.*, 36.
- ⁸³ Mariano Noriel, Note dated May 4, 1897 in *ibid.*, 36.
- ⁸⁴ Consejo de Guerra, Record of Proceedings, May 5, 1897, in *ibid.*, 37.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 37a.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 39a-40.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 40.
- ⁸⁹ It was not alleged that Andres and Procopio themselves had fired at the troops. Not one bullet, Andres testified, had been spent from his revolver Andres Bonifacio, Declaration dated May 4, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 31.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 40a-41a.
- ⁹¹ *The court martial of Andres Bonifacio*, with prefatory note by Teodoro M. Kalaw and translated into English from the original Tagalog by Paz Policarpio, (Manila: Manila Book Co., 1926), xii.
- ⁹² Agoncillo, *Revolt of the Masses*, 300-1.
- ⁹³ Quirino, "Historical Introduction," as cited, 26.
- ⁹⁴ Abraham F. Sarmiento, *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The appeal* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2005), 95.
- ⁹⁵ Quirino, "Historical Introduction," as cited, 24.
- ⁹⁶ Sarmiento, *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The appeal*, 86.
- ⁹⁷ Quirino, "Historical Introduction," as cited, 26.
- ⁹⁸ Andres Bonifacio, Declaration dated May 4, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 31a.
- ⁹⁹ Trias, Letter to the President in Mapagibig (Amadeo), as cited.
- ¹⁰⁰ Mariano Noriel, Note to Emilio Aguinaldo, May 7, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 43a.
- ¹⁰¹ Baldomero Aguinaldo, Letter to Emilio Aguinaldo, May 8, 1897, in *ibid.*, 44-45a.
- ¹⁰² Aguinaldo, *Mga gunita*, 225-6.
- ¹⁰³ Pangulohan ng Sangkatagalugan at sa Hokbo, Decision dated May 8, 1897, in *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The original documents*, 46.
- ¹⁰⁴ Note dated May 8, 1897, in *ibid.*, 48.
- ¹⁰⁵ Emilio Aguinaldo, "Sa mga kinauukulan," statement dated March 22, 1948, in Agoncillo, *Revolt of the Masses*, 292.
- ¹⁰⁶ Epifanio de los Santos, "Andrés Bonifacio" [English version], *Philippine Review (Revista Filipina)*, III:1-2 (January-February 1918), 50; Ricarte, *Himagsikan*, 82.
- ¹⁰⁷ Aguinaldo, "Sa mga kinauukulan," as cited.
- ¹⁰⁸ De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited.
- ¹⁰⁹ Lazaro Makapagal, Letter to José P. Santos, June 27, 1929 in Santos, *Andres Bonifacio at ang Himagsikan*, 30-3. [Also published in translation as "How We Executed Bonifacio," *Philippines Free Press*, November 29, 1929.] Makapagal told the sad story on a few occasions. His accounts vary in detail, but not on the date, place and basic sequence of events. See also, for example, "Bonifacio's Execution – Told by his Executioner," *Philippines Free Press*, December 1, 1928; Extracts from an account Makapagal wrote for the Veteranos de la Revolución (translated from the Spanish) in José P. Santos, *Ang mahiwagang pagkapatay kay Andres Bonifacio* (Manila [?]: n.pub, 1935), 17-8; and Lazaro Makapagal, "Biografía de Andres Bonifacio," in Dalomag [Emilio Aguinaldo], "Sa pinakamahalagang kabuhayan ng ama ng Katipunan, dakilang Andres Bonifacio," unpublished typescript, 1948, n.pp.
- ¹¹⁰ Gregoria de Jesus, Letter to José P. Santos, June 2, 1929 in Tenepe [José P. Santos, Teresita Santos and Nena Santos], "Si Andres Bonifacio at ang Katipunan," unpublished manuscript, 1948, 168. De Jesus says Zulueta was involved in the execution - "Ang nagsiganap sa pagbaril ay si Lazaro Makapagal na katulong si Jose Zulueta - and other sources say explicitly that he was present. Makapagal does not name the riflemen in any of his accounts, and Zulueta was perhaps one of them. Others in the squad were later said to have been Isidro Concepcion and Leon Ramirez, both from Bacoor, and Leon Novenario from Pateros. Epifanio de los Santos, "Andrés Bonifacio" [English version], 51; José P. Santos, *Ang mahiwagang pagkapatay kay Andres Bonifacio* (Manila [?]: n.pub, 1935), 18; and José P. Bantug, Letter to José P. Santos, April 12, 1928, in José P. Santos, *Mga kasulatang lumiliwanag sa pagkakatapatay kay Andres Bonifacio* (Manila [?]: n.pub. 1935), 39.

¹¹¹ De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited. Makapagal also recalled the encounter. He told her a lie, he admitted, "but out of pity I had to lie, realizing that the truth at that moment would kill her. What else could I have told her when I pitied her so?" Lazaro Makapagal, Letter to José P. Santos, June 27, 1929, as cited.

¹¹² De Bonifacio, "Kasulatan," as cited.

¹¹³ Ibid.

Responsibility for errors in these notes is not entirely mine. Many of the errors are embedded in the sources.

As always, comments and corrections are welcome, to kasaysayan@googlemail.com